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NOTES
management will hesitate to offer employee benefits in the future, and
labor will suffer in the end.
The need for remedial legislation is evident. It has been suggested
by management that the Act be amended to exclude specifically from
the area of required collective bargaining certain subjects which have
traditionally been considered, because of their nature, within the ex-
clusive domain of management, e.g., health, welfare benefit, and stock
purchase plans.r9 The Act would thereby provide the Board with a
more definite framework or basis for deciding what is within or with-
out the scope of compulsory bargaining. Alternatively, the Board
should, on its own initiative, set up rules defining those areas where
management is free to act unilaterally without apprehension of inter-
ference or intrusion by labor through the Board's decisions.
USE OF A FOREIGN TRUST TO Avow THE NEW YORK RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Introduction
The purpose of the Rule against Perpetuities has been to preserve
'the alienability of property.' The Rule terminated an historic conflict
between the English landlords and the common-law courts. The land-
lords' desire to keep estates in the family line for as long as possible
was at cross purposes with the policy of the English courts, which
were by tradition in favor of freedom of alienation.2 Although the
with the advancement of working conditions and employee benefits without the
prodding of collective bargaining can no longer improve the lot of their em-
ployees without first bargaining with their union. This is not conductive to
further voluntary improvement of the employee's status because the employer
will have to await the union's demand because he knows that if he makes an
offer, the union will pyramid something on top of that offer so that they can
claim* credit for it. Employers, knowing this, will make no voluntary offers
and will'give way slowly to the-union demands and will'make every effort
short of having a strike to keep the benefits at the least possible level consis-
tent with the industry level. They cannot afford to volunteer any improvements
or grant any more benefits because if they make an offer of X amount, they
know the union will demand X plus." Id. at 10.
59 See Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor. of the House
of Representatives, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1080-1082, 1100-1102, 2208, 3545-3546
(1953).
1 See GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 297 (4th ed. 1942) ; PowELL,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS 299 (1940).
2 See 7 HOLDSWoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 193-202 (2d ed. 1937);
CASNER AND LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 275 (1951).
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conflict was eventually resolved in favor of alienability, this solution
was opposed at every stage of its development. Thus, after judicial
decision had permitted the use of a common recovery to disentail
estates, 3 landlords prevented alienation by subjecting property to in-
destructible future contingent interests.4 To prohibit this last device,
the Rule against Perpetuities was devised.5
In effect, the common-law Rule established a limitation on the
period during which property could be made inalienable by being sub-
jected to a future interest.6 Under this Rule, future interests were
invalid unless they were to vest not later than lives in being at the
creation of the interest plus twenty-one years.7 The common-law Rule
against Perpetuities has been codified by the majority of the states.
The Rule prevails without substantial modification in about three-
fourths of the states, and is accepted with slight variations by an
additional eleven states.8
The New York Rule
The New York Rule against Perpetuities represents an excep-
tion to the general approval accorded to the common-law Rule and,
with the possible exception of Arizona, has no parallel in any other
state.9 When New York departed from the common-law Rule in
1828, ° instead of limiting remoteness of vesting on the common-law
basis of plural lives, a "two-life" limitation was adopted." Today,
as a result of this action, the permissible period of inalienability is
shorter in New York than in any other jurisdiction. 12  In addition,
the construction which the New York courts have given the New
York Rule in attempts to mitigate some of its mischievous conse-
quences has caused the Rule to become particularly obscure.13  As a
3 See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 139.
4 Id. at 297.
5 Ibid.
6 See POWE.L, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS 299-300
(1940) ; SImEs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 367 (1951).
7 See GRAY, THE RuI.E AGAINST PERPETUITIES 191 (4th ed. 1942).
8 See 1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(H), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REViSION Commi.lsSIoN
130-133 (1936).
9 "Thus the two-life rule has no recognition outside of Arizona, Michigan,
Minnesota and New York; applies nowhere but in New York to dispositions of
personalty and has been rendered of negligible importance in both Michigan and
Minnesota." Id. at 134. In 1949 the Michigan Rule against Perpetuities was
repealed and the common-law Rule adopted. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.49(1)
(Supp. 1953).
10 N.Y. REv. STAT. 1829, c. 1, tit. 2, §§ 13-16.
11 "Every future estate shall be void in its creation, which shall suspend the
absolute power of alienation, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a
longer period than during the continuance of not more than two lives in being
at the creation of the estate. . . ." N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42.
12 See POWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TRUsTS 303 (1940).
13 See 1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(H), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REVISION CoMissioN
119, 121 (1936).
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result, its labyrinthine ways hinder the average lawyer in an important
part of his practice.14 The consequence of the New York Rule against
Perpetuities, as stated by Professor Gray, is that ".... in no civilized
country is the making of a will so delicate an operation, and so likely
to fail of success, as in New York." 15
It is difficult to find any justification for the two-life limitation
adopted in New York. On the contrary, many factors indicate that
the present Rule should be repudiated. One of these factors is the
uniqueness of the New York Rule. It is clear that this singularity
is not justified by a public policy in any way different from that of
the rest of the nation.16 Moreover, the New York Rule is ill-
conceived. Rules against Perpetuities seek, in general, to limit the
duration of inalienability. The period of suspension does not depend,
however, on the number of lives in being at the creation of the estate,
but rather upon the longevity of the measuring lives chosen.17 How-
ever, the most serious of the objections raised against the New York
Rule is its adverse consequences to the residents of New York State.
In addition to the possibility that the testator's will may fail because
of the Rule's obscurities,' 8 it is simply not suited to the average family
with more than one child.' 9 Furthermore, the Rule is the occasion
of an unequal federal estate tax burden.2 0  Under the common-law
Rule, a trust may be created which postpones the estate tax until the
death of the last beneficiary. The only limitation under the common
law is that the beneficiary must have been alive at the creation of the
4Ibid.
Is GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETuITIEs 687 (4th ed. 1942). But see
Finkelstein, Notes on the New York Rule Against Suspension of the Power
of Alienation, 5 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 10 (1930).
26 See Russell, Proposed Changes in the New York Rule Against Perpetuities,
6 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 50, 67 (1931).
17 See Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112, 145-146, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030,
1043 (1805) ; see Russell, supra note 16, -t 58-60.
18 See 1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(H), REPORT, N.Y. LAw RmsioN CommrssIoN
120 (1936).
1"x,. . . [C]ertain types of reasonable settlements are impossible under our
restricted permissible period:
"A testator cannot provide a trust fund for the benefit of his children(if more than two) until all reach majority (or other age), so as to secure the
advantages of flexibility, varying distribution of income and successive gifts
over to survivors until the youngest living survivor reaches twenty-one.
A fortiori, a testator cannot set up an indivisible trust for more than two chil-
dren, or other beneficiaries, during their lives....
"A testator can set up a trust for the benefit of his son for life but he
cannot ordinarily require the continuance of the trust for the benefit of his son's
children until they reach majority unless the benefit is limited to children in
being at the testator's death. Even then either a finding of separate trusts at
the death of the son or measurement upon the life of one child is requisite."
1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(H), REPORT, N.Y. LAw REvisION CoMMISSI N 121-122
(1936).
20 See Looker, Practical Effects of Differences in the Rule against Per-
petuities, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES 653 (1951).
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trust. In New York, however, the estate tax cannot be postponed
beyond the death of two beneficiaries, and thus must be paid more
frequently than under the common-law Rule.21
In light of the many disadvantages of the New York Rule against
Perpetuities, the law in jurisdictions which follow the common-law
Rule seems preferable. There appear to be at least two methods
whereby New York residents may obtain the benefit of the more suit-
able common-law Rule. One method is direct-statutory amendment
modeled after the Rule against Perpetuities of another state.22 In
lieu of that, however, an indirect method may be possible-creation
of an extraterritorial trust whose validity is governed by the Rule in
force in another jurisdiction.23
Avoiding the New York Rule
Before examining the New York decisions bearing upon the
success or failure of this latter proposal, it is necessary to demarcate
the scope of the problem. To begin with, it is futile to employ this
device in situations involving trusts of real property. Where realty
is involved, it is completely impossible to effect the application of a
Rule against Perpetuities other than that in force at the situs of the
land transferred.24 The law of the situs governs real property trusts
regardless of the domicile of any of the parties, or the mode of
transfer.25
21 Ibid.2 2 Although the movement to alter the New York Rule against Perpetuities
seems to have spent its former energy, a recent proposal has been made to
reinstate the common-law Rule as to the immediate family. See ComrTTE
ON LAW REFORm, REPORT ON PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE STATUTES OF NEW
YORK RELATING TO THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND TO RESTRAINTS UPON
ALIENATION, 2 REcoRD OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
37 (1947).
23 In this connection Professor Russell has stated that the New York Rule
against Perpetuities is the best asset of trust companies in states contiguous to
New York. See Russell, Proposed Changes in the New York Rule Against
Perpetuities, 6 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 50, 66 (1931). "Moreover, variations in
state income, property, and estate tax laws often make the creation of a trust
in a state other than that of the settlor's residence a profitable arrangement."
Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws, 44 HARv. L. REv. 161,
162 (1930). The advantages thus derived, which in addition include satisfac-
tion of the estate program and decreased federal estate tax burden, must be
balanced against the possibility of double taxation.
24 Hobson v. Hale, 95 N.Y. 588 (1884) ; Knox v. Jones, 47 N.Y. 389 (1872);
see Trowbridge v. Metcalf, 5 App. Div. 318, 320, 39 N.Y. Supp. 241, 242 (1st
Dep't 1896), aff'd miern. sub noin. Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 158 N.Y. 682,
52 N.E. 1126 (1899). See N.Y. Dac. EST. LAW § 47. Since the policy against
perpetuities concerns the manner in which property is held within a certain
jurisdiction (see note 39 infra), the nature of real property makes it impossible
to avoid the operation of the Rule. The situation is manifestly different where
trusts of movables are concerned.
25 See GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERFEUITIES 283 (4th ed. 1942). Since
personal property is not so jealously guarded, the conflict of laws principles
[ VOL. 29
In general, where the elements of a trust are distributed between
two or more jurisdictions, the courts, in determining the particular
law which governs the trust, will consider the various contacts of the
trust with the jurisdictions involved.26 Originally, the domicile of the
creator of the trust was the sole jurisdictional contact considered,27
but more recently, non-domiciliary law, i.e., the law of the situs or
the place of administration, has been held to govern .2  This recent
tendency is noteworthy since, if followed in New York, it would en-
able a New York domiciliary to satisfy his preference for the Rule
against Perpetuities of another jurisdiction. On the other hand, if
New York were to follow the older view, the application of the law
of the creator's domicile would frustrate any such choice. In view
of this polarity, the particular direction the New York courts have
embarked upon is highly significant. Whether or not they apply
domiciliary or non-domiciliary law when faced with a problem in-
volving the suspension of the power of alienation, should determine
the result of any attempt to obtain the benefit of a foreign Rule against
Perpetuities.
governing real property may be avoided if the transferor directs conversion of
his realty into personalty. By virtue of the doctrine of equitable conversion,
where a testamentary disposition is made, the testator is considered as dying
seized of personal property. The conflict of laws principles governing trusts
of personal property consequently govern the trust. See, e.g., Hope v. Brewer,
136 N.Y. 126, 32 N.E. 558 (1892); Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N.Y. 424
(1871).
26 Cf. Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 305, 113 N.E.2d 424, 431
(1953). See Swabenland, The Conflict of Laws in Administration of Express
Trusts of Personal Property, 45 YALE L.J. 438 (1936). "In the absence of an
express statement by the settlor as to which law is intended to govern, the
courts have referred to and considered the following factors to determine the
governing law:
1. The domicil of the creator of the trust.
2. The place in which the trust deed was executed.
3. The language of the trust instrument.
4. The place of probate of the will.
5. The location of the trust property.
6. The domicil of the trustee.
7. The domicil of the beneficiary.
8. The place in which the business of the trust is carried on.
9. The intention of the creator." Id. at 442-443. In this article, discus-
sion of the jurisdictional contacts will be limited to the domicile of the creator
and the situs or the place of administration of the trust. In addition, the par-
ticular law governing interpretation, matters of form, administration, etc., will
not be considered except in relation to the Rule against Perpetuities.
27 See STORY, CONFLICr OF LAws § 383 (1834). ". . [T]he laws of the
owner's domicil should in all cases determine the validity of every transfer,
alienation, or disposition made by the owner, Whether it be inter vivos, or post
mortem." For a criticism of this view, see CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 559-565 (3d ed. 1947).
2S See notes 32 and 33 infra. It has been indicated that non-domiciliary
law may be applied to sustain a trust provided the creator selects ". . . the law
of a state which has some substantial connection with the trust." LAND, TRUSTS
IN THE CONFLcTr OF LAWS 116, 118 (1940).
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An inter vivos or testamentary personal property trust may be
created which violates the New York Rule against Perpetuities. If
the trust has been created by a New York domiciliary and is to be
administered in New York, the trust will clearly fail. However, a
trust may be sustained if the domicile of the creator is in one state
and the situs or place of administration is in another state. This may
occur in one of two ways.
One possibility is that the creator of the trust may be a domi-
ciliary of a foreign state where the trust conforms to the Rule against
Perpetuities. In this situation, although an inter vivos 29 or testa-
mentary 30 trust has been created which violates the New York Rule,
and the trust is to be administered in New York, it will be sustained
by the New York courts.31
On the other hand, a trust may be created which violates the
Rule against Perpetuities of the creator's domicile, but is in conformity
with the law of the place of administration. Under these conditions
inter vivos trusts have been treated differently from testamentary
trusts. Although there are few New York cases involving the sus-
pension of the power of alienation by a New York domiciliary, if the
trust is inter vivos it will probably be sustained.3 2  New York courts
have applied the law of the situs to uphold inter vivos trusts which
were invalid at the creator's domicile but valid at the place of situs.
3 3
29 Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937) ; Town-
send v. Allen, 59 Hun 622, 13 N.Y. Supp. 73 (Gen. T. 1st Dep't), aff'd iner.,
126 N.Y. 646, 27 N.E. 853 (1891); see Curtis v. Curtis, 185 App. Div. 391,
395, 173 N.Y. Supp. 103, 105 (1st Dep't 1918). But see City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Cheek, 202 Misc. 303, 307, 110 N.Y.S.2d 434, 437 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
30 Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N.Y. 30, 35 N.E. 407 (1893) ; Cross v. United
States Trust Co., 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125 (1892); Guaranty Trust Co. v.
Leach, 168 Misc. 526, 5 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Whitney v. Dodge,
105 Cal. 192, 38 Pac. 636 (1894). Contra: Matter of Clarkson, 201 Misc.
943, 107 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Surr. Ct. 1951), 1 BUFFALO L. REV. 307 (1952). Since
the policy against perpetuities concerns the manner in which property is held
in a certain jurisdiction (see note 39 in-fra), it would seem to follow that if a
trust is invalid where it is to be administered, the trust should be overturned
although it is valid under the law of the creator's domicile. The courts have
not, however, reached this conclusion, apparently because of the insignificant
variations in the Rule against Perpetuities in the various states. No strong
local policy is violated if property is held in the state without conforming to
local law. See Cross v. United States Trust Co., supra at 341-343, 30 N.E. at
127-128; Whitney v. Dodge, supra, 38 Pac. at 638.
31 This result has been reached in other jurisdictions. See Liberty Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. New England Investors Shares, Inc., 25 F.2d 493
(D. Mass. 1928), 27 MIcH. L. Rnv. 464 (1929).
32 See Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College, 185 N.Y. 485, 78 N.E. 359
(1906) (charitable beneficiary); see Matter of Griswold, 99 N.Y.S.2d 420,
428-432 (Sup. Ct. 1950). This result has been reached in foreign jurisdictions.
See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 26 Del. Ch. 397, 24 A.2d
309 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Second Nat. Bank v. Curie, 116 N.J. Eq. 101, 172 AtI.
560 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
3 See Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933), 33 COL. L. REv.
1251; accord, Bouree v. Trust Francais des Actions de la Franco-Wyoming Oil
Co., 14 Del. Ch. 332, 127 Atl. 56 (Ch. 1924).
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No distinction based on the Rule against Perpetuities in the settlor's
domicile seems to have been made in the cases. 3 4 Instead, the courts
have concerned themselves with the law which governs the validity
of trusts in general.3 5
The law governing testamentary trusts presents an entirely dif-
ferent problem. 36 The testamentary trust derives its legal significance
from the testator's will, and the validity of the will, matters of inter-
pretation, form, etc., are usually governed by the law of the testator's
domicile.3 7  Similarly, the Rule against Perpetuities may govern the
validity of a will. Therefore, on the surface it would appear that a
conflict of laws problem which involves the suspension of the power
of alienation should be resolved by reference to the Rule in force at
the testator's domicile.3 8  This apparently logical conclusion is re-
futed, however, by the reasoning underlying the policy against
perpetuities.
The Rule against Perpetuities is aimed at the holding (not the
transfer) of property within the jurisdiction for a period of time
deemed contrary to public policy.3 9 Since that "holding" obviously
takes place in the state where the trust is to be administered, it would
appear that the validity of a trust should be determined according to
the Rule against Perpetuities in force at the place of administration. 40
34 See Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws, 44 HARV. L.
Rv. 161, 167 (1930).
35 Ibid.
36 The different treatment given inter vivos and testamentary trusts may
perhaps be due to the fact that in determining the validity of an inter vivos
trust it is extremely doubtful which law governs, whereas in the case of a
testamentary trust reference is first made to the testator's will. See GRAy, THE
RuLE AGAINST PEWETurrIms 284 (4th ed. 1942).
3 See Cavers, supra note 34, at 162-163; RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 306, 308 (1934).
38 See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 294.7 (1935), citing Cross v. United
States Trust Co., 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125 (1892); SHATTUCK AND FARR,
AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 282 (2d ed. 1953). But see GOODRIcH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 490-491 (3d ed. 1949), citing Hope v. Brewer, 136 N.Y. 126,
32 N.E. 558 (1892). Both the Cross and the Hope cases were decided by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1892, with Judge O'Brien writing the decision
each time. Far from being inconsistent, Judge O'Brien expressed the view in
the Hope case that the court was merely required to ". . . go a step farther
and hold another but a kindred proposition. . . ." Id. at 139, 32 N.E. at 562.
39 See Hope v. Brewer, supra note 38 at 138, 32 N.E. at 561; Kurzman v.
Lowy, 23 Misc. 380, 382-383, 52 N.Y. Supp. 83, 85 (Sup. Ct. 1898) ; see Cavers,
Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws, 44 HARv. L. IEv. 161, 165 (1930).
Professor Beale recognized this proposition in relation to local statutes ap-
plicable to charitable bequests. See Beale, Equitable Interests in Foreign Prop-
erty, 20 HARv. L. REv. 382, 393-394 (1907).4 0 See 2 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1321-1322 (3d ed 1905) ; RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs § 240, comment b (Proposed Final Draft No. 2,
1931); Note, 32 COL. L. REv. 680, 683 (1932). The final draft of the
Restatement does not mention perpetuities, however. Instead, the general
rule is stated: "The validity of a trust of movables created by a will is de-
termined by the law of the testator's domicil at the time of his death."
1955 ]
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In any event, it is obvious that the policy of the Rule in force at the
testator's domicile is not violated if the property is to be removed
from the state and held in another jurisdiction. 41 In such case, there
is no reason why the courts of the testator's domicile should pursue
the fund and see that it is held in strict harmony with their law.4 2
This is especially true if to do so would cause a trust, which is other-
wise valid, to be overturned.
The nature of the legal restriction in the testator's domicile should
be considered before a specific domiciliary law is held to govern a
testamentary disposition. Although as a general rule it is true that
the law of the testator's domicile governs the validity of a will, this
should be true only so far as the formal requisites of the will, the
capacity of the testator, and the construction of the will are con-
cerned.43 It should not apply for the purpose of regulating the manner
in which property is held in another jurisdiction. 44  Thus, the rule
in New York is, as stated by Professor VWhiteside:
Where the designated trustee -of a personal property trust is a corporation
created by and located in another state, and the fund is to be there held and
administered, and the trust is legal under the laws of the foreign state the
courts of New York will transmit the fund to the foreign jurisdiction to be
held on the trusts indicated, even though such trusts would be void as sus-
pending the power of alienation in New York. 45
Although from the above it would seem clear in principle that
the Rule against Perpetuities in force at the place of administration
should govern the validity of a trust, the few authorities that exist on
this question are divided. New York courts have rarely had to de-
termine whether the Rule in force at the place of administration or
that in force at the testator's domicile governed a testamentary trust.
In Cross v. United States Trust Co., it was held that domiciliary law
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 295 (1934). The Restatement's silence
has been interpreted by Professor Gray as leaving the question open. See
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 290 n.7 (4th ed. 1942).41See Hope v. Brewer, stpra note 38 at 142, 32 N.E. at 562; Manice v.
Manice, 43 N.Y. 303, 388-389 (1871); Stieglitz v. Attorney-General, 91 Misc.
139, 141, 154 N.Y. Supp. 137, 138 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Kurzman v. Lowy, supra
note 39 at 382-383, 52 N.Y. Supp. at 85; Draper v. Harvard College, 57 How.
Pr. 269, 271 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1879).
42 See Hope v. Brewer, supra note 38 at 140, 32 N.E. at 562; Chamberlain
v. Chamberlain, 43 N.Y. 424, 434 (1871) ; Manice v. Manice, supra note 41.
4 See Hope v. Brewer, 136 N.Y, 126, 142, 32 N.E. 558, 562 (1892) ; Stieglitz
v. Attorney-General, supra note 41 at 142, 154 N.Y. Supp. at 138; see CHAPLIN,
SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION § 525 (1891).
44 See Hope v. Brewer, supra note 43; see CHAPLIN, op. cit. supra note 43,
§ 530.
45 Whiteside, Suspeiwion of the Power of Alienation in New York, 13 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 31, 39 (1927). See also GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrrIES
289 (4th ed. 1942) ; 1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(H), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REVSIOiN
CoMMIssIoN 69 (1936).
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governed.46  In the Cross case a foreign domiciliary had created a
trust to be administered in New York. Although the trust established
a perpetuity in contravention of New York law, it was sustained on
the ground that it was valid at the testator's domicile in Rhode Island.
It should be noted, however, that in the Cross case the application
of domiciliary law sustained the trust. Moreover, the Cross case in-
volved a trust created in another state to be administered in New
York, not the converse situation where a trust is created by a New
York domiciliary to be administered in another state. The question
naturally arises, therefore, whether a contrary result might occur
when, in the latter situation, to apply domiciliary law would invalidate
the trust.
New York courts have in fact upheld such trusts. In a series
of cases involving foreign charitable beneficiaries, trusts which created
perpetuities prohibited by New York law have been sustained through
the application of the Rule against Perpetuities in force at the place
of administration. 47  But despite the broad language in these cases,48
it has nevertheless been implied that the application of the Rule against
Perpetuities of the place of administration is confined to charitable
trusts and that the law of the testator's domicile otherwise governs. 49
A recent lower-court case, Matter of Samuels,50 bears out this view.
There, the court decided that a testamentary trust of personal prop-
erty was invalid by virtue of the New York Rule against Perpetuities
although it was valid in Massachusetts where it was to be admin-
istered. This case appears to stand alone in adopting such a position,
however.
Prior to the Samuels case, the problem of selecting the Rule
against Perpetuities to govern a testamentary trust created by a New
York domiciliary to be administered elsewhere, seems to have arisen
solely in connection with charitable beneficiaries. Although it was
true that the law of the place of administration had been applied to
46 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125 (1892). See also Dammert v. Osborn, 140
N.Y. 30, 35 N.E. 407 (1893); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Leach, 168 Misc. 526,
5 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 193) ; Whitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal. 192, 38 Pac. 636(1894). Contra: Matter of Clarkson, 201 Misc. 943, 107 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Surr.
Ct. 1951).
47 See Hope v. Brewer, supra note 43; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43
N.Y. 424 (1871); Manice v. Manice, 43 N.Y. 303 (1871); Matter of Grant,
200 Misc. 35, 101 N.Y.S.2d 423 (Surr. Ct. 1950) ; Matter of Feehan, 135 Misc.
903, 241 N.Y. Supp. 669 (Surr. Ct. 1929).
48 See notes 39, 41-44 supra.
49 See Hatchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 391, 187 N.E. 65, 69 (1933) ; see
2 BEArS, CoNFrIcT OF LAWS § 294.7 (1935). This view is opposed to the result
reached in several foreign jurisdictions where private testamentary trusts which
were invalid under the law of the testator's domicile were sustained through
the application of the law of the place of administration. See, e.g., Matter of
Chappell, 124 Wash. 128, 213 Pac. 684 (1923) ; Fordyce v. Bridges, 2 Ph. 497,
515, 41 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1042 (1848).50 205 Misc. 368, 128 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
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sustain charitable trusts and no others, it could only be conjectured
what the result would be when a case appeared involving a non-
charitable beneficiary. When a case did appear for what seems to
be the first time, in Matter of Samuels, the law was simply stated,
without being considered at length in the decision. The court's only
reason for its decision was that testamentary dispositions of property
are in general governed by the rules in force at the testator's domicile.
There does not seem to be any logical basis for distinguishing
between charitable and non-charitable testamentary trusts.51 Though
it is true that the courts are more inclined to save the former, the
purpose of the Rule against Perpetuities is the same regardless of the
public benefits to be expected from the trust. In either case the ob-
jective of the Rule is not fulfilled by requiring that property be held
in foreign jurisdictions in conformity with New York law. Moreover,
the material difference between the law of domicile and the place of
administration is so slight that New York courts should not fear that
their public policy would be diluted by the application of foreign law
to transfers by New York domiciliaries.5 2 Furthermore, the result in
the Samuels case is contrary to the tendency of New York courts to
mitigate the harsh consequences of the New York Rule and to sus-
tain a trust wherever possible.
Conclusion
New York courts have, as a rule,5 3 demonstrated a tendency
which would sustain both inter vivos and testamentary trusts
(1) where they are created in another jurisdiction to be administered
in New York, and conversely, (2) where they are created by a New
York domiciliary to be administered elsewhere.54  In the first in-
stance, the trusts were sustained through the application of the law
of the creator's domicile, and in the second instance, through the ap-
plication of the law of the situs or the place of administration. Thus
it would appear that neither the domicile of the creator nor the situs
or the place of administration can be said to be the exclusive factor
which the courts consider in determining the law governing the valid-
ity of a trust. With few exceptions, New York courts have demon-
strated an inclination to sustain a trust if they can do so through the
51 See Comment, 39 YALE L.J. 100, 103 n.14 (1929).
52 See Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 103-105, 9 N.E.2d 792, 794
(1937) ; Cross v. United States Trust Co., 131 N.Y. 330, 341-343, 30 N.E. 125,
127-128 (1892) ; see Note, 32 COL. L. REv. 680, 682 (1932).
53 The two apparent exceptions are Matter of Samuels, 205 Misc. 368, 128
N.Y.S.2d 349 (Surr. Ct. 1954), and Matter of Clarkson, 201 Misc. 943, 107
N.Y.S.2d 289 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
54 See notes 29, 30, 32 and 47 supra; see Peabody v. Kent, 153 App. Div.
286, 290, 138 N.Y. Supp. 32, 35 (2d Dep't 1912).
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application of either domiciliary or non-domiciliary law. The effect
of this shifting rule is to impose a geographic limitation on the ap-
plicability of the New York Rule against Perpetuities. The Rule ap-
parently applies only where a resident of New York establishes a
trust to be administered in New York.55 Depending on the weight
of the Sainuels case, however, non-charitable testamentary trusts may
be excluded from this rather ideal limitation.
The New York Rule against Perpetuities will not apply to an
inter vivos trust of personal property with a foreign situs; nor will
it apply if the beneficiary of a testamentary trust is a foreign charity
and the trust is to be administered in another jurisdiction. If, in the
latter case, the beneficiary is not a charity, the law can only be
described as uncertain.
STATE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO WORK
Introduction
Governmental policy in the United States, echoing what is un-
doubtedly the sentiment of most Americans, has sought to encourage
competition in industry. This has required the enactment of legisla-
tion against those who would combine in order to raise artificially the
price of their goods, either directly or indirectly. Such laws, however,
impinge upon the liberty of those whom they affect by preventing
them from contracting as they wish. It is therefore necessary to sub-
ject all such legislation to the closest scrutiny to determine whether
or not the liberty which it preserves is greater than that which it
restricts.
In recent years many states have enacted so-called "right-to-
work" 1 laws, which prohibit the conventional union shop contract
and other union-security devices. These statutes would appear to
come within the general category of legislation the purpose of which
is the maintenance of competition, since the underlying rationale is
5 See 2 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1325 (3d ed. 1905).
1 Terminology in this field is fraught with partisan overtones. Union
leaders prefer to call these enactments "anti-union-security" laws, rather than
"right-to-work" statutes. This is in harmony with their use of the term "union
security" rather than "closed shop," "union shop," "maintenance of membership,"
etc. It cannot be denied that the term "right-to-work" is misleading, if it is
understood to mean a literal right to be employed. Such a "right," though for-
eign to American political concepts, is common among authoritarian regimes.
E.g., ARGENTINA CONsT. Art. XXXVII, § 1(1); Spain: Labor Charter, Art. I,§ 8; U.S.S.R. CoNsT. Art. CXVIII. In this article the terms "right-to-work"
and "union security" will be employed in the interest of brevity and uniformity.
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